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Restoring The Necessity Of Timely Court
Approval For The Assumption or Rejection Of
Unexpired Leases Under Bankruptcy Code Section
365(d)(4)
Anthony Michael Sabino*
Mary Jane C. Sabino**
PREAMBLE

As part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984,1 Congress added a new paragraph to section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the section which governs the assumption or rejection by the trustee of unexpired leases and executory contracts
of the debtor.2 The new provision, section 365(d)(4), provides that
if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property within sixty days after the entry of the
order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for
cause, fixes within such sixty day period, then such lease is deemed
rejected. s Therefore, the trustee must assume or reject such a lease
or obtain an extension of time within those first sixty days.
A serious question has arisen as to what constitutes the requisite
* Anthony Michael Sabino is a graduate of St. John's University School of Law (J.D.
1983) and St. John's University College of Business Administration (B.S. 1980). He was
formerly Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable D. Joseph DeVito, United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of New Jersey. Admitted to practice in the states of New York and
Pennsylvania, Mr. Sabino is presently associated with the New York City law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.
** Mary Jane C. Sabino is a 1983 graduate of St. John's University School of Law
(J.D.) and a 1979 graduate, cum laude, of Manhattanville College (B.A.). Admitted to practice in the states of New York and Pennsylvania, she presently maintains a private practice
with a primary emphasis in real estate.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) [hereinafter BAFJA].
2. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3. Id. Its text is as follows:
(4) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in a case under any chapter of this title,
if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real
property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days after the date of the
order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60day period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to the lessor.
Id.
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steps to be taken within the statutory sixty day period. Specifically, does section 365(d)(4) demand that court approval, undeniably the vital, final step in the process, be given within the initial
sixty days to complete the act of assumption or rejection of the
nonresidential lease or the granting of an extension of time in
which to do so? While it is accepted as the better and majority
view that, at a minimum, the trustee must file a formal motion to
do one of the three within the sixty days in order to be timely
under section 365(d)(4)," the question still is unresolved as to the
necessity of obtaining court approval before the expiration of that
sixty day period. Since the last occasion this author addressed the
issue,5 the controversy has intensified as the dichotomy between
opposing doctrines widens and conflicting precedents accumulate.
Indeed, as commented upon by Chief Bankruptcy Judge Duberstein, "[tihere appears to be no end in the litigation arising out of
11 U.S.C. 365(d)(4)."
Most importantly, the United States Supreme Court recently denied a petition for certiorari in the case of City of Long Beach v.
Southwest Aircraft Services, Inc.7 By declining to review the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Southwest Aircraft Services, Inc. v.
City of Long Beach (In re Southwest Aircraft Services, Inc.),8
where that appellate court decreed court approval need not be
granted within the sixty days, the high court has left standing an
opinion which possibly misconstrues the clear wording of the statute in question and in so doing fails to properly interpret section
365 (d)(4) with due deference to the self-evident goals of the legislature in enacting it. Lacking definitive guidance from the high
Court, it is asserted here that Southwest III only serves to widen
the existing gap between itself and a number of other opinions
grounded upon the plain language of section 365(d)(4) and related
statutes, its lengthy historical development and applicable
precedents.
This article will explore the protracted congressional development of section 365(d)(4), its evolutionary roots in the former
4. See Treat Fitness Center, Inc. v. Rainbow Inv. Co. (In re Treat Fitness Center,
Inc.), 60 Bankr. 878, 879 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (Elliott, J.), cited in In re Lew Mark Cleaners Corp., 86 Bankr. 331, 333 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (Duberstein, C.J.).
5. A. Sabino, The Necessity of Court Approval for the Assumption or Rejection of
Unexpired Leases Under Code Section 365(d)(4): Defusing the Ticking Time Bomb, 91
COMM. L.J. 405 (1986).
6. In re Lew Mark Cleaners Corp., 86 Bankr. at 332.
U.S.
, 108 S.Ct. 2848 (1988).
7. __
8. 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Southwest III].
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Bankruptcy Act and the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and its enactment
as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984. Most importantly, focus will be given to the divergence in
opinion among the numerous courts which have addressed the issue. Lastly, confronting the alarming trend away from the realization of the true intent of section 365(d)(4), this writing shall review
discussions of proposed alterations to section 365(d)(4) and suggest
methods to resolve the dilemma by a congressional re-examination
of the law and remedial legislation.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

What is unique about section 365(d)(4) is that it is almost exclusively a product of reform efforts made by the United States Senate in the aftermath of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978." The ultimate language of the statute propounded in
1984 represents a focused effort to resolve difficulties inherent in
the assumption or rejection of nonresidential real property leases
since the days of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898.10 Moreover,
section 365(d)(4) was "enacted to protect landlords," as observed
by Bankruptcy Judge Brozman in In re Fosko Markets, Inc."
A scant four years after the Code's enactment in 1978, the Senate realized that a major deficiency existed in section 365. As structured at the time, an unexpired lease had to be assumed or rejected by the trustee within sixty days after the order for relief was
entered in a Chapter 7 liquidation case. 12 However, a different rule
obtained in Chapter 11 reorganization cases. There the trustee
could wait until the end of the case to make a decision to so assume or reject.' 3 Needless to say, this built-in delay was highly inequitable and worked a hardship upon lessors, particularly shopping center lessors. To remedy the situation, Senators Hatch and
DeConcini introduced S. 2297 on March 29, 19821' to "strengthen
existing protections for shopping center landlords and lessors in15
the event of the reorganization of [sic] liquidation of a tenant.'
9. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
10. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at former 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1103 (1976)), repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, §
401, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978).
11. 74 Bankr. 384, 388 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
12. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 365(d)(1), 92 Stat. 2549, 2575-76 (1978).
13. Id.
14. S. 2297, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
15. Resnick, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AND STRATEGY + 2.02[b] [iii] (Block-Lieb, "Legislative History") (1987) [hereinafter Resnick].
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The subsequent Senate hearings on S.2297 are insightful as to the
legislative concerns behind what became known as "The Shopping
Center Protections Improvements Act of 1982."1 6
As stated by Bankruptcy Judge Chinin in In re Bernard" the
statutory reform "was the result of heavy lobbying by the lessors
. . . often frustrated by the long delay in regaining possession of
their property" while it sat vacant and not producing income.1 8 In
a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Courts,1 9 the roster of witnesses was dominated by lessors, particularly as represented by the International Council of Shopping
Centers, shopping center managers and solvent tenants. No contrary testimony was offered by lessees or parties representing debtors' interests. Taking testimony from the former group, it was asserted that any extended tenant vacancy "can seriously disrupt
. . . the entire shopping center."2 An oppressive problem had
been created by the failure of the 1978 Code "to require the trustee to accept or reject the unexpired lease within a specified time
limit in a nonliquidation type bankruptcy proceeding."'" As a solution, the International Council of Shopping Centers proposed an
amendment to section 365 with language virtually identical to the
present section 365(d)(4).2 2
To be sure, the proponents of S. 2297 were not only concerned
with remedying harmful delays caused by the trustee's failure to
act to assume or reject in an ascertainable time. Further delays
attributable to the lack of decisive court action within a time certain were also crucial to the bill's supporters. The most telling
statements were made by Nathan B. Feinstein, a prominent attorney representing the International Council of Shopping Centers. In
prepared comments, Mr. Feinstein noted the delays inherent in the
lessor applying for an order requiring the trustee to act to assume
or reject, such as the twenty or thirty days given to the trustee to
respond thereto and additionally a similar lapse of time before a
16. Parenthetically, it should be noted the Senate hearings referred to "Protections
Improvements" in the singular, while the Senate Report utilized the plurals as indicated in
this text.
17. 69 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986).
18. Id. at 14.
19. Hearings on S. 2297 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 3, 1982).
20. Id. at 4 (testimony of Wallace R. Woodbury, International Council of Shopping
Centers).
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 33 (prepared statement of Wallace R. Woodbury).
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hearing would be held. Of paramount importance here was his assertion that "[i]f the landlord's application is contested or argued,
the bankruptcy court may keep the matter under consideration for
weeks or months before the order to assume or reject is issued."2
S. 2297 was reported favorably to the entire Senate on August
17, 1982 by Senator Thurmond, Chairman of the Committee on
the Judiciary.2 " The stated purpose of the bill was to clarify and
improve protections for shopping centers and their solvent tenants
which proved "ineffective" under the Code.25 Reviewing the 1978
Code, the Report asserted "Congress clearly intended to provide
special protections for shopping centers and their solvent tenants"
in the lease assumption/rejection scenario.2 6 The Report noted
that, given the importance of and substantial benefits derived to
the retail economy from shopping centers, "the operation of bankruptcy law ... must be strictly limited and minimized" in its impact of shopping center businesses.2 7
After reviewing the testimony given at the earlier hearing,2 8 the
Judiciary Committee expressed its concern that the lengthy delays
associated with the process of lease assumption or rejection were
detrimental to both lessors and solvent tenants and thus needed to
be rectified.2 9 The proposed solution of S. 2297 was to "impos[e] a
60 day time limit on the trustee's decision to assume or reject the
lease in all cases under the Code, unless the court, for cause, allows
additional time.""0 As stated by the Committee, the amendments
"make effective the protections Congress intended to provide shopping centers and their tenants ... by removing latent defects" in
the 1978 Code. 1 The amendments "do
not change the policy of the
32
policy.
that
implement
they
Code;
S. 2297 was then brought to the floor of the Senate on October 1,
1982. 3 ' After a technical change limiting the sixty day period to
assume or reject to unexpired leases, Senator Hatch noted again
the amendment "establishes a 60-day time limit for the adminis23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 79-80 (prepared statement of Nathan B. Feinstein, Esq.)
S. REP. No. 527, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 10-12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
130 CONG. REC. S13227 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
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trator's decision to assume or reject a lease.

Senate.3

'3 4

The bill was voted

upon and passed by the full
However, the House of Representatives took no action whatsoever and S. 2297 was left
unenacted.36 The House also took no action during the NinetySeventh Congress on Representative Butler's proposed amendments related to leasehold management as part of H.R. 7294"7 and
H.R. 7349.8

Notwithstanding the demise of S. 2297, the shopping center
amendments found new life as part of S. 445, the "Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983" proposed by the Senate in the
98th Congress.3 True to its name, this bill was an attempt to rectify a number of problem areas in the Code, as exacerbated by the
landmark Supreme Court decision in Northern Pipe Line Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.40 As with S. 2297, the
Omnibus Act was reported favorably and recommended for passage by Senator Thurmond on behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary.41
Within the proposed bill was a "Subtitle C - Leasehold Management Bankruptcy Amendments," a section virtually identical to
the 1982 Shopping Center Protections Improvements Act. 41 Once

again, the Senate rationale for change was a recognition of Congress' intent for the Code to deal with the "potential harm to shopping centers and their solvent tenants" caused by tenant bankruptcies and the failure of the 1978 Reform Act to carry out this
Congressional intent. 43 The foremost problem was again the trus-

tee's failure to decide to assume or reject a lease.44 Interestingly,
the language in the 1982 report accompanying the Shopping
Center Protections Improvements Act is repeated in the Omnibus
Act with respect to the special protections intended for shopping
centers and their tenants, the "latent defects" in the Bankruptcy
Code and the goal of the proposed amendments not to change the
34.
35.
36.
Resnick,
37.
38.
39.
port for
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at S13228-29.
Id. at S13229.
See LEGI-SLATE Report for the 97th Congress, Description of S. 2297. See also
supra note 15.
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See also Resnick, supra note 15.
S. 445 was introduced in the Senate on February 2, 1983. See LEGI-SLATE Rethe 98th Congress, Description of S. 445.
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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policy of the Code, but instead to implement it.45 Indeed, the
Leasehold Management Bankruptcy Amendments subtitle put
great reliance upon the May 3, 1982 hearings held as part of S.
2297.4e Once again, the proposed solution was to impose a sixty
47
day time limit on the trustee's decision to assume or reject.
Less than three weeks after the Omnibus Act was proposed, S.
2297 was also resurrected as S. 549, The Shopping Center Tenant
Bankruptcy Protections Improvements Act of 1983. S. 549 was incorporated into the Omnibus Act"' and was later reported and recommended for passage on May 4, 1983."' As the title indicated, it
was practically a mirror image of its 1982 predecessor and represented another attempt to bring these amendments forward for enactment. 0 However, despite the presence of two proposals addressing this issue of the time to assume or reject unexpired leases, no
further action was taken."' Like S. 2297 in the 97th Congress, the
Omnibus Act and S. 549 quietly died in Congress and no amendments were made to section 365.52
Finally, it was the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 5 which provided the vehicle to amend section 365
and supposedly rectify-the unexpired lease assumption/rejection issue. The legislative history of BAFJA5 tells us that the House version did not originally contain any material addressing the matter.
It was the Senate which added a Subtitle C, later adopted by the
House, which contained amendments altering the treatment of
unexpired nonresidential leases in order to protect shopping center
lessors. 5 These amendments became law and gave us the present
version of section 365(d)(4)." 6
Of particular pertinence to this inquiry is the statement deliv45. Id. at 35.
46. Id. at 36-37.
47. Id. at 37.
48. See LEGI-SLATE Report for the 98th Congress, Description of S. 549.
49. S. REP. No. 70, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983).
50. Id.
51. Note H.R. 2377, the House companion to S. 549, also passed away without action
after being introduced by Representative Sawyer. See LEGI-SLATE Report for the 98th
Congress, Description of S. 549.
52. See supra notes 39 and 48.
53. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
54. No Senate or House Report was submitted with this legislation and the House
Conference Report did not contain a Joint Explanatory Statement. Statements by the legislative leaders made in the Congressional Record were set out as the legislative history. 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 576.
55. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 577.
56. Id. at 590.
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ered by Senator Hatch, the progenitor of the seminal 1982 shopping center amendments.5 7 The Senator noted BAFJA incorporated as Subtitle C51 amendments virtually identical to the 1983 S.
549, which were given "overwhelming approval by the [Judiciary]
committee and which unanimously passed the Senate in 1982 and
1983."' 0 Again, the bill was designed to lessen the tenant vacancy
problem by requiring the trustee to decide to assume or reject
within sixty days. 0
In review, it is clear the Senate was persistent in amending section 365 to implement the policy considerations behind the 1978
Code, which the Bankruptcy Reform Act failed to do. Obviously,
the legislators intended to enact special protections for lessors, especially shopping center lessors. While concerns focused on the
failure of trustees to act promptly, it cannot be denied that delays
attributable to the differing priorities of the bankruptcy courts
were also at issue. Indeed, to address one without the other would
have utterly failed to rectify the situation. Thus, the legislative history tells us that the Congress, seeking to end the troublesome delays incipient in the process of assumption or rejection, imposed an
unambiguous limit of sixty days for the consummation of such action, including court approval, as to unexpired nonresidential real
property leases.
COURT APPROVAL UNDER THE ACT

Without a doubt, at least some of the blame for today's confusion can be attributed to the imprecision of the former Bankruptcy
Act. The predecessor to section 365 of the Code was the former
Act's section 70b.' Like section 365, section 70b provided for the
assumption of executory contracts which, by definition, included
unexpired leases of real property.2 Section 70b parallels the modern Code in its imposition of a time limit of sixty days after adjudication or thirty days after qualification of the trustee, whichever
is later. The trustee must assume or reject an unexpired lease
57. S. 2297, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
58. Indeed these amendments were also Subtitle C in the 1983 Omnibus Act. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 598.
60. Id. at 599. See also In re Re-Trac Corp., 59 Bankr. 251, 255 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1986) (Kressel, J.) (BAFJA intended to provide lessors with more certainty about debtors/
lessees).
61. Bankruptcy Act, supra note 10, § 70b (former 11 U.S.C. § 110).
62. Bankruptcy Act, supra note 10, § 106(7) (former 11 U.S.C. § 506(7)).
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within such time."
Authoritative commentary considered an effective assumption to
include court approval, stating "[tihe trustee cannot assume
merely in his own mind."'" However, the cases under the former
Act do not uniformly follow this ideal. Where the trustee only gave
oral notice to the interested parties within the allotted time, such
was held to be sufficient and formal written notice was not required. 5 Similarly, there was an implied assumption of a contract
by the trustee, by virtue of the bankruptcy referee's previous ruling deeming the contract valid and compelling the trustee to honor
its terms. The trustee was thus in substantial compliance with section 70b, even without court approval. 6 The foregoing seemed to
postulate a loose standard of informal acts by the trustee, which
did not include obtaining court approval within the statutory period. The vagaries of the case law were further aggravated by former Bankruptcy Rule 607, which merely held the trustee shall obtain court approval before assuming a contract "[wihenever
'67
practicable.
The better view, one not subject to a criticism of informality,
was set forth in the case of Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular
de Puerto Rico. 8 On the appeal of a district court order approving
the debtor's plan of reorganization, the lessor objected to the trustee's failure to secure a court order authorizing assumption of the
lease. Looking to the former Act's section 116(1),69 the fifth circuit
concluded "Congress intended . . . a judicial inquiry . . . be held

[so that] . . . an executory contract could be rejected only with
permission of the court.17 0 The panel ruled "[rejection] requires
judicial action and decision by the judge and not merely administrative action and decision by the trustee. ' 71 The statutes, said the
court, were not designed to dislodge the adjudicative power from
the court and install it in the trustee.72 Assumption is so crucial to
the financial status of a debtor in reorganization, said the tribunal,
63.
64.
65.
66.

Bankruptcy Act, supra note 10, § 70(b) (former 11 U.S.C. § 110).
4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 70.43[6] (14th ed. 1978).
Nostromo, Inc. v. Fahrenrog, 388 F.2d 82, 84-85 (8th Cir. 1968).
In re Forgee Metal Products, 299 F.2d 799, 801-02 (3d Cir. 1956).

67.

13

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

V607.06 (14th ed. 1978).

68. 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1966).
69. "The judge may . . . permit the rejection of executory contracts." Bankruptcy
Act, supra note 10, § 116(1) (former 11 U.S.C. § 516(1)).
70. 360 F.2d at 584.
71. Id. (footnote omitted).
72. Id.
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it should not be implied from the trustee's conduct alone, "but
should be the result only of judicial consideration.""
In sum, the unclear provisions of the Act were rectified by a judicial formulation of a better view mandating judicial approval as
the final, necessary step in the assumption/rejection process. For as
stated by the leading treatise, "[v]iewed as a matter of principle,
there is little doubt that the decisive word should be with the court
• . .particularly because the assumption of a contract [or lease]
entails the assumption of liabilities" thereunder. 4
COURT APPROVAL UNDER THE CODE BEFORE

BAFJA

The enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197811 assimilated the assumption and rejection powers into section 365 of the
new Bankruptcy Code. 76 The advent of the Code, unfortunately,
did not entirely remedy the confusion over what were the necessary steps to achieve a complete assumption or rejection. Some
courts still clung to the old informality standard. A case in point
was In re Avery Arnold Construction,Inc.7 ' Based upon the trustee's oral notice to the landlord of the trustee's intention to assume
and assign the unexpired lease, the court found the oral assumption to be valid, as it was made within the statutory sixty days.7 8
73. Id. (footnote omitted). Accord Bradshaw v. Loveless (In re American National
Trust), 426 F.2d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 1970) ("Assumption ... can only be effected through
an express order of the judge."). See also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.23[5] (14th ed.
1978).
74. 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY V 70.43[5] (14th ed. 1978).
75. Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
76. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2574-77 (1978). In pertinent part, Section 365 then
read as follows:
§365. Executory contracts and unexpired leases
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b),
(c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
(d)(1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject
an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60 days after the order
for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day
period, fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.
(2) In a case under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, the trustee may assume or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor at any time before the
confirmation of a plan, but the court, on request of any party to such contract or
lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time whether to
assume or reject such contract or lease.
Id.
77.
78.

11 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
Id. at 35.
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Overruling the landlord's contention that the lease should be
deemed rejected, the court stated: "The Code is silent as to the
formality required to assume a contract or lease .. . Although the
court's approval is mandatory, the 'assumption' may precede 'approval' and therefore, there is no requirement that the approval
occur within the 60 day period. 7' 9 Crucial therein was Bankruptcy

Judge Britton's comment that he found the Nostromo case 0 persuasive. Finding the oral notice under section 70b of the former
Bankruptcy Act permissible per Nostromo, the court maintained it
was equally allowable under section 365 of the new Code.81 Nevertheless, the court did soundly criticize the trustee, admonishing
him to be more explicit in communicating his intention to assume
and to move with greater alacrity in bringing the matter before the
court.2
To be sure, not all courts opted to carry the informality of the
former Act over into the Code. As in the past, proponents of a
more formal construction were to be heard. In Frank C. Videon,
Inc. v. Marple Publishing Co., Inc. (In re Marple Publishing Co.,
Inc.),8s the debtor never acted to assume its unexpired lease until
the filing of its plan of reorganization. The plan was filed some
eight weeks after the statutory sixty days had expired. The landlord, electing to treat the matter as if the lease had been assumed,
moved for a cure of the defaulted rent. The bankruptcy court denied the landlord's motion and ruled the lease had been rejected."s
While acknowledging the Code "contains very little" and section
365 itself fails to delineate a proper sequence of events necessary
to effectuate assumption, Bankruptcy Judge Goldhaber affirmed
the absolute need for court approval: 5 "[A]ny assumption or rejection of an unexpired lease is devoid of validity without the court's
approval. In the case at bench no one sought or obtained the approval of the court. . . . The attempted assumption . . . [was],
8' 6
therefore, devoid of legal significance.
79. Id.
80. Nostromo, Inc. v. Fahrenrog, 388 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1968).
81. 11 Bankr. at 35. Accord In re Ro-An Food Enterprises, 41 Bankr. 416, 418-19
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Wexler, J.) (action less formal than by motion is permissible). But
see In re Lew Mark Cleaners Corp., 86 Bankr. 331, 334 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (Ro-An can
no longer be followed because it preceded BAFJA and dealt with unusual circumstances).
82. In re Avery Arnold Construction, Inc., 11 Bankr. 34, 35-36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
83. 20 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
84. Id. at 934-35.
85. Id. at 935.
86. Id.
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Among the cases demanding court approval as necessarily incidental to a completed assumption, the most prominent is Sealy
Uptown v. Kelly Lyn Franchise Co. (In re Kelly Lyn Franchise
Co.). 87 In a strongly worded opinion, Bankruptcy Judge Lundin
forcefully advocated the view of Texas Importing Co.,"8 while explicitly rejecting the less stringent requirements of Nostromo.5
Ruling against the debtor's allegation it had assumed its unexpired
lease by implication, the court said:
The court rejects debtor's contention that the assumption of an unexpired
lease can be accomplished by implication . . . . The court finds, however,
that even under the Act, the majority rule and the better rule was that judicial approval was required before allowing the assumption or rejection of an
unexpired lease ....
Assumption or rejection by implication or by action
leads inevitably to the kind of confusion and uncertainty exemplified by
this case. Moreover, the explicit requirement of court approval is now clear
under the language of § 365(a) of the Code.
. . . Thus, any uncertainty which may have existed under the Act concerning the requirement for court approval of assumption or rejection is no
longer a serious issue under 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 365 (West 1979).1

Further, the court addressed the policy issues at stake in matters
of assumption or rejection:
The requirement of court approval furthers the Code policy of maximizing the value of the estate for the benefit of all creditors, while preserving
certain rights of parties to contracts with the debtor ...
This case provides a classic example of why assumption by action should
be disapproved and the Code requirement of court approval strictly
enforced.9 '

In closing, Judge Lundin succinctly stated there can be no substitute for court approval of assumption or rejection under section
365.92
Kelly Lyn was subsequently cited by Bankruptcy Judge Shelley
in In re A.H. Robins Co.,93 where an action was brought to declare
the debtor-in-possession had assumed certain executory insurance
contracts. Calling Kelly Lyn a "well-reasoned opinion," the court
87.
88.
1966).
89.
90.
91.
92.
(Bankr.
93.

26 Bankr. 441 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 33 Bankr. 112 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
Nostromo, Inc. v. Fahrenrog, 388 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1968).
26 Bankr. at 444-45 (citations omitted).
Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added).
Id. at 446. Accord In re Price Chopper Supermarkets, Inc., 19 Bankr. 462, 467
S.D. Cal. 1982) (Meyers, J.) ("[Alny action must be presented for court approval.").
68 Bankr. 705 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
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went on to decide that the language of section 365 was clear. "An
executory contract," said the court, "may not be assumed without
court approval."94 As further reinforcement for that "plain language of the statute," the bankruptcy judge looked to Bankruptcy
Rule 6006, which calls for a court hearing on a motion to assume or
95
reject.
Bankruptcy Judge Shelley neatly summarized the point in his
opinion by ruling "it is not until the Court has been afforded the
opportunity to review the facts before it and to make its own determinations of the legal issues involved that the procedure contemplated by the Code and Rules may be fully realized." 9 Court
approval is "critical," and indeed is "an indispensable step in the
process." 91 Declaring judicial approval "not a perfunctory step,"
the court denied the motion. 8
Pausing to reflect, the advent of the new Bankruptcy Code
brought with it the adoption of a more formal standard requiring
court approval as the final, necessary step in the process of assumption or rejection. Clearly, the informality of the former Act
was discarded. Led by Kelly Lyn, the newly constituted bankruptcy courts looked to both the modern statutes and the Bankruptcy Rules as mandating court approval to be an integral step in
the assumption or rejection of an unexpired lease.
THE NECESSITY OF COURT APPROVAL UNDER

BAFJA

No doubt the current dilemma over the interpretation of section
365(d)(4) is due largely to the fact that the statute does not, in and
of itself, specify if court approval is a requisite step to be taken
within the sixty days as part of the assumption or rejection process. This being so, a further examination of section 365(a), the
opening paragraph of that provision, is called for.
"Section 365(a) directs that the Trustee, subject to the Court's
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor."9 9 Moreover, the legislative history
mimics this phraseology. 00 Notably, the pertinent portion of sec94. Id. at 708-09.
95. Id. at 709.
96. Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 710.
98. Id. at 711.
99. Jyoti, Inc. v. Ho's Ltd. (In re Ho's Ltd.), 82 Bankr. 342, 344 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1988) (Gibbons, J.) (emphasis in the original). See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
100. H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 349 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:35

tion 365(a) has not been changed at all since its enactment in 1978.
There can be no question that in these situations where the trustee
seeks to assume or reject, "[tihe decision is one that must be made
with the approval of the court." 101 While the learned treatise does
not expound beyond the above postulation, it is suggested here
that Congress, cognizant of the informality problems under the
former Act, desired to eliminate that conflict by explicitly mandating court approval as a required step in the process.
In any comparative analysis of sections 365(a) and 365(d)(4), the
commonality of purpose therein demands these paragraphs be
viewed as in pari materia. The generally accepted principles of
statutory construction require section 365(d)(4) be interpreted in
light of section 365(a)'s requirements.1 02
Indeed, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Eisen of the Northern District
of Illinois declared that section 365(d)(4) "must be considered in
conjunction" with section 365(a) with regard to the act of assumption. 1 3 The certain result is that section 365(d)(4) mandates court
approval as a necessary step, by virtue of section 365(a) subjecting
any assumption or rejection to such court approval.
Cognizance must also be taken of Bankruptcy Rule 6006. That
procedural rule demands a hearing on a motion to assume or reject."0 The Advisory Committee Note further holds "Section
365(a) of the Code requires court approval for the assumption or
rejection of an executory contract" or, a priori, an unexpired lease,
"by the trustee or debtor-in-possession."1 0 5 As noted by one district court, the differences between the informality of former Rule
607 under the Act and the more rigorous standard under current
Bankruptcy Rule 6006 "bespeak Congressional intent to
strengthen the role of the court in the assumption/rejection decision-making process."1 06 Therefore, "Bankruptcy Rule 6006 reinCONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6304; See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5845.
101. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03 (15th ed. 1985).
102. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 191 (2d ed. 1974). "The different parts of a statute reflect light upon each other, and statutory provisions are regarded as in pari materia
where they are parts of the same act. Hence, a statute should be construed in its entirety,
and as a whole." Id.
103. In re BDM Corp., 71 Bankr. 142, 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987), citing In re Bon
Ton Restaurant & Pastry Shop, Inc., 52 Bankr. 850, 852 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (Eisen,

C.J.).
104. BANKR. R. 6006(c).
105. BANKR. R. 6006, advisory committee's note.
106. Swiss Hot Dog Co. v. Vail Village Inn, Inc. (In re Swiss Hot Dog Co.), 72 Bankr.
569, 573 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (Kane, J.).
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forces the conclusion that court approval is necessary before the
[trustee or] debtor-in-possession may assume or reject an execu10 7
tory contract.
Such propositions as the foregoing were advocated by the Nevada bankruptcy court in In re Las Margaritas,Inc. 08 Denying a
motion to assume an unexpired lease, Bankruptcy Judge Thompson further relied on the Kelly Lyn decision and endorsed its postulation of the "better view" requiring prior court approval.1 0 9 The
court found that "[n]ot only was this the majority rule it was the
Ninth Circuit rule."1 10 Most importantly, the court stated its decision to deny assumption due to the lack of timely court approval
was rendered "even more compelling under the Code, due to the
explicit language of section 365(a)." 111
In finding its ruling comporting with the Ninth Circuit rule, the
Las Margaritascourt cited to Local Joint Executive Board, AFLCIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc.' In that appeal, the tribunal addressed
the tensions between the former Bankruptcy Act and the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) with respect to executory labor contracts.1 3 Pertinent here is Circuit Judge Wallace's notation that
the bankruptcy receiver (or trustee) possesses "limited, strictly
construed authority." '' For that reason, the panel reiterated its
view that it was well settled law that for "important decisions,
whatever their character, the trustee must get the court's approval." 1 5 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals joined
in the view of its sister circuits in Texas Importing and American
National Trust as to the necessity of court approval in the assumption or rejection process.1 16
What might have been the decisive last word on this subject emanated once more from, ironically, the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey v.
Department of Labor (In re Harris Management Co., Inc.) by
then-circuit judge Anthony Kennedy.1 7 "The primary issue" there
107. In re A.H. Robins Co., 68 Bankr. 705, 709 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
108. 54 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985).
109. Id. at 99.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citations omitted).
112. 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 211.
114. Id. at 215.
115. Id. at 216 (quoting Newport v. Sampsell, 233 F.2d 944, 946 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 942 (1956)).
116. 613 F.2d at 216.
117. 791 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1986).
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was whether the bankruptcy court's approval of a stipulation
resolving the disposition of funds due under a government contract
"affected an assumption [of the contract] . . .under 11 U.S.C. §
365."" 1 Citing to Kelly Lyn, Circuit Judge Kennedy opined "[w]e
agree that assumption under section 365 requires the express approval of the court."' 9 Little else can be added to such an une20
quivocal statement.1
To be sure, Harris Management did not deal with section
365(d)(4) specifically. But its mandate that section 365 requires
court approval clearly speaks to that statute in all of its applications. One can only speculate as to what impact Justice Kennedy
would have had in formulating an opinion had the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Southwest III.
Therefore, the foregoing decisions tell us that "it is clear that
there can be no assumption without court approval."'' A fortiori,
the act of assumption is not complete until the court grants its
imprimatur of approval. Sound principles of statutory construction
demand as much. Furthermore, the courts themselves have applied
this principle in the majority of circuits. The crucial point here is
the consistency of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
propounding the view that court approval is necessary to complete
the assumption or rejection of an unexpired lease. These decisions
contain no qualification as to this requirement. For that very reason, it is difficult to reconcile the sharp departure from the above
made by that appellate court in the Southwest III decision.
COURT APPROVAL NOT NECESSARY WITHIN THE SIxTY DAYS-THE

SOUTHWEST

III

HOLDING

In Southwest Aircraft Services, Inc. v. City of Long Beach (In
re Southwest Aircraft Services, Inc.), 22 the Ninth Circuit was
asked to resolve a question of first impression in the circuit courts
regarding the interpretation of section 365(d)(4).123 In the proceed118. Id. at 1414.
119. Id. at 1414 (emphasis added). See also Data-Link Systems, Inc. v. Whitcomb &
Keller Mortgage Co., Inc. (In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co., Inc.) 715 F.2d 375, 380
(7th Cir. 1983) (Jameson, J).
120. See also Swiss Hot Dog Co. v. Vail Village Inn, Inc. (In re Swiss Hot Dog Co.), 72
Bankr. at 571.
121. In re Condominium Admin. Serv., Inc., 55 Bankr. 792, 799 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985) (Paskay, C.J.) (recognizing Kelly Lyn as "better reasoned," but nevertheless ruling
court approval may fall outside the 60 days).
122. 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 848.
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ings below, the bankruptcy court deemed the nonresidential lease
rejected because it did not hear the debtor's motion to extend the
time to assume or reject until after the sixty days expired. The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy judge, but
the circuit court reversed.12 4
Stating that its objective in interpreting a federal statute is to
ascertain the intent of Congress, the tribunal determined it must
first look at the language of the statute. However, it found the
meaning of section 365(d)(4) to be unclear. 1 5
After dissecting the provision itself, the court rejected the appellees' contention that the literal wording of the statute demanded
court action on the motion for the extension within the sixty days
and -not beyond. Instead, the majority adopted the "more liberal
reading" that the cause for the extension must arise within the
sixty days but there was "no express limit on when the bankruptcy
court must hear and decide the motion."' 12
Nevertheless, the majority did not seem convinced of its own
reading of the statute. In fact, it recognized that the argument advanced by the appellees "would by far be the stronger one" if one
were to look "only to the face of the statute." 2 " Still searching for
another possible interpretation, the Ninth Circuit turned to the
legislative history.1 28 Here the court uncovered "some support" for
1 29
its reversal.
Essentially, the circuit court took the view that "there is no reference to any requirement that the bankruptcy judge make his
finding within any particular period of time." The failure of Congress to articulate "any deadline within which the court must act is
fairly indicative of its intent."13 0 The majority held "that Congress
would not adopt such a rule without clearly indicating in the legislative history its intention to do so and explaining its reasons."131
Justifying its ruling, the court went on to say that the interpretation demanding court action within the sixty days "would produce arbitrary and fortuitous results" by causing diligent debtors
124. Id. at 849.
125. Id. at 849-50.
126. Id. at 850.
127. Id. at 850.
128. Id. Notably, the court stated even if the statute were unambiguous, it considered
the results below so arbitrary and unfair, it still would have probed the legislative history.
Id. at 850 n.2.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 851.
131. Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
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to forfeit valuable leasehold assets if the court did not decide the
motion within sixty days. 132 Finding that numerous reasons may
make it impractical or impossible for a bankruptcy court to act
within such a "fairly short time deadline," the tribunal refused to
interpret section 365(d)(4) as a legislative attempt to force bankruptcy courts to act with undue haste. Moreover, the court declared that such an interpretation might worsen the problems of
lessors by encouraging debtors to routinely ask for extensions of
time before fully considering the value of an unexpired lease.' 33
In sum, the Ninth Circuit held the interpretation of section
365(d)(4) advanced in the courts below "would produce fortuitous
and inequitable results. It would also require us to assume that
Congress intended to take the most unusual and highly questionable step of interfering with the normal operations of the judicial
branch." Such a restrictive interpretation, said the court, does not
accurately reflect the intent of Congress.13 ' On such theories, the
appellate court reversed. 3 '
Prior to Southwest III, a similar decision was reached in the
nearby District of Utah in In re By-Rite Distributing,Inc. v. Brierley (In re By-Rite Distributing, Inc.) 36 Reversing the bankruptcy judge's finding that the lease was rejected because the hearing took place beyond the sixtieth day,137 Chief District Court
Judge Jenkins found section 365(d)(4) "does not expressly require
the bankruptcy court to rule within the sixty-day period on the
trustee's decision to assume a lease."' 3 8 Bifurcating the statute into
two acts, separate and distinct, the district court ruled that it is
sufficient if within the sixty days the trustee decides to assume or
reject and signifies this by filing a motion with the court to communicate his intentions.' s9 This, said Judge Jenkins, completes the
act of assumption for purposes for section 365(d)(4), notwithstanding the lack of court approval.14 0 "The express language of the
132. Id. at 852.
133. Id. at 852. See also Turgeon v. Victoria Station Inc.(In re Victoria Station, Inc.),
840 F. 2d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 1988) (following Southwest III).
134. Southwest III, supra note 8, 831 F.2d at 853 (9th Cir. 1987).
135. Id.
136. 55 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)[hereinafter By-Rite II].
137. See In re By-Rite Distributing, Inc., 47 Bankr. 660, 669-70 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)
[hereinafter By Rite I].
138. 55 Bankr. at 742.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 743.
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statute imposes no such deadline for the court's action."' 41 Congress' only concern, found the court, was to compel the trustee to
decide to assume within sixty days, not to dictate court
2
calendars.14
Another key decision building up to the Southwest III ruling
was In re Wedtech Corp.14 Ruling on the scandal-ridden debtor's
motion to extend its time to assume a lease, the bankruptcy judge
noted the split among the courts as to the required timing of the
court's approval and found the cases permitting judicial action
outside the sixty days as "far more persuasive. "144
Bankruptcy Judge Buschman framed the issue as whether Congress had an underlying purpose for section 365(d)(4) inconsistent
with its literal wording which indicated the extension must be ordered by the court before the end of the sixty days. Not surpris5
ingly, the Wedtech court found what it sought."
Examining the legislative history, the court acknowledged Congress' concern for the uncertainty of landlords prior to BAFJA. It
went on to state the legislature's focus was on the "for cause" aspect of granting an extension.1 46 "By enacting the requirement that
the court find cause," Bankruptcy Judge Buschman opined Congress must have intended bankruptcy courts not be inhibited by a
time restraint that could prevent them from reaching a well-reasoned decision.1 47 Particular note was taken of the "voluminous
calendar" bankruptcy judges must hear, 4 8 including priority matters for injunctive relief, and the desirability for written opinions
as opposed to bench decisions. Indeed, this court apparently felt
threatened that a literal reading of section 365(d)(4) would result
in it being unable to "perform fully, ably and after appropriate
consideration.' ' 4 9 Furthermore, the court expressed its concern
that extension motions would become pro forma, thus logjamming
141. Id.
142. Id. at 744.
143. 72 Bankr. 464 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
144. Id. at 468.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 469.
147. Id.
148. Bankruptcy Judge Buschman expressed this concern earlier in In re Bygaph, Inc.,
56 Bankr. 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), where he stated the notion that court approval must
be given within the 60 days "is questionable given the heavy calendar of this Court." Id. at
601 n.3. Nevertheless, the court found it met that burden when it gave judicial approval
within 60 days measured from the date of a determinative state court ruling on the lease at
issue. Id. at 601-02 n.3.
149. In re Wedtech Corp., 72 Bankr. at 469.
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the courts and compromising counsel's due diligence responsibilities to make reasonable inquiries as to the propriety of such a motion. 150 This would result, said the bankruptcy judge, in the routine
granting of extensions of time by bankruptcy judges without careful factual development and principled decision making. 1 '
Following on the heels of Southwest III was Tigr Restaurant,
Inc. v. Rouse S.I. Shopping Center, Inc. 52 To be sure, the Tigr
Restaurant court did not directly address the question of the necessity of court approval within the sixty days. The precise question before the bench was whether or not the bankruptcy judge,
after already granting one extension of the sixty days as permitted
under section 365(d)(4), could grant a further extension, which of
course would constitute a decision outside the original sixty days.
However, the ruling of the district court is worthy of discussion
here not only because of its comments with respect to court approval, but more importantly because its decision to allow further
extensions is a necessary branch of the school of thought that court
approval need not be given within the sixty days.
In his opinion, District Judge Dearie commenced by stating he
found section 365(d)(4) "not so unambiguous as the Bankruptcy
Court believed, and moreover that the construction chosen by the
Bankruptcy Court so frustrates the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code that it is untenable."' 53 Noting the statute empowers the
bankruptcy court to grant extensions of such additional time
within the initial sixty days, the court stated its belief that the
sixty day period "could refer to sixty-day periods within 'such additional time.' ,5" Such a construction, said the court, "furthers
the plain statutory purpose."' 5 5
Looking only to the comments made in the legislative history by
Senator Hatch, District Judge Dearie contended the congressional
intent was merely to "protect lessors from retroactive grants of extended time."' 56 It is conceivable the court was influenced by fac150. Id. at 470. See In re Musikahn Corp., 57 Bankr. 938, 942 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(Parente, J.).
151. 72 Bankr. at 470.
152. 79 Bankr. 954 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (disagreeing with In re House of Deals of
Broward, Inc., 67 Bankr. 23 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (Holland, J.)) and In re Alba Press,
Inc., 55 Bankr. 27 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Holland, J.).
153. 79 Bankr. at 955. See also In re Unit Portions of Delaware, Inc., 53 Bankr. 83, 84
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Parente, J.).
154. 79 Bankr. at 955 (quoting from 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
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tors it enumerated such as the leasehold at stake was the sole asset
of the debtor, the tenant space was not vacant and the current rent
was being paid. 15'
Lastly, the district judge turned to section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code 15

as "ample authority for the Bankruptcy Court to

grant an additional extension" of time.'51 Looking to Southwest III
and By-Rite H, this court concluded that section 365(d)(4) was
only "intended to limit the actions of the debtor or trustee, but not
those of the court."'160
District Judge Dearie went on to make additional comments, reflecting thinking similar to Southwest III and the cases aligned
with it. Finding "flexibility" in the statute "which, literally
read, . . . appears to be rigid," the court opined that the reality of

court calendars would not necessarily permit decisions in just a few
days. 6' This would in turn force debtors to move early to assume
and "deprive them of the reasonable opportunity to exercise business judgment.'

62

The above decisions are troublesome in a number of respects.
Primarily, they perceive ambiguity in a statute which, it is asserted
here, is simply without such an impediment. Concomitant to this
viewpoint are the efforts of these courts to ameliorate what they
deem to be the harsh and unjust results that would obtain should
they apply section 365(d)(4) as it is written. Lastly, these holdings
contend that surely Congress would not have intended to impose
such restrictions of time upon the bankruptcy courts.
To be sure, the issues raised by these courts are not frivolous.
But the proper forum for addressing such matters lies with the legislative branch, not the judiciary. To do otherwise is to condone
judicial legislation. Southwest III and its progeny go far afield in
interpreting section 365(d)(4) by placing the concerns of the judicial branch above the plain language of the statute and the manifest intent of Congress which supports it.
157. Id. at 957.
158. See 11 U.S.C § 105(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 105 states in pertinent
part that "[tihe ... court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." Id.
159. Tigr Restaurant, Inc. v. Rouse S.I. Shopping Center, Inc., 79 Bankr. at 957. See
also In re Telemark Management Co., Inc., 51 Bankr. 623, 627 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984)
(Frawley J.) (refusing to imply a limitation on the § 105 power).
160. 79 Bankr. at 957 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 958.
162. Id.
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THE NECESSITY FOR COURT APPROVAL WITHIN THE SIXTY
DAYS-THE COASTAL DOCTRINE

Having expounded upon the legislative history, the evolution of
section 365 and the contrary cases, it is now appropriate to review
the key holdings comprising the better view demanding that court
approval to reject or assume an unexpired nonresidential real
property lease be granted within the statutory sixty days. The trilogy central to this perspective reached its zenith with In re
Coastal Industries.6" However, the two decisions which laid the
foundation are no less important and are discussed first to reflect
the actual chronology.
The seminal case here was the bankruptcy court's opinion in In
re By-Rite Distributing, Inc.,'64 which as aforenoted was subsequently reversed by the district court.1 65 The facts tell us the
debtor filed its motion to assume certain unexpired leases on the
sixtieth day after the entry of the order for relief. This was the last
day it could do so by virtue of the statute. The hearing took place
several weeks later. The bankruptcy court deemed the leases rejected for reason of the hearing being held beyond the sixtieth day.
Following an exhaustive analysis of section 365(d)(4), Bankruptcy Judge Allen found the terms "assumption" and "court approval" used therein to be "correlative."' 66 A three-point sequence
for assumption was postulated by the bankruptcy court. This
called for 1) the trustee to decide to assume, 2) a court determination relating to curing defaults and assuring adequate performance
under the lease and, lastly, 3) actual judicial approval. 6 7 "Assumption presupposes approval by the bankruptcy court," opined Judge
Allen. 6 8 Further, the debtor's contention that its mere filing of the
motion to assume within the sixty days was adequate was specifically rejected by the court. 69 The time to assume or reject, said
the court, is not extended by the filing of a motion alone.170 Judge
Allen graphically characterized section 365(d)(4) as "a time bomb
that begins ticking relentlessly and irresistibly" towards automatic
rejection unless defused by achieving assumption with court
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

58 Bankr. 48 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
47 Bankr. 660 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
55 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
47 Bankr. at 669.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 670.
Id.
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approval. 171
The bankruptcy court's original decision in In re Southwest Aircraft Services, Inc. 17 2 posed facts concerning the trustee's third alternative under section 365(d)(4), to seek an extension of time
within the sixty days following the entry of the order for relief. In
this matter, the trustee filed the motion for the extension within
the sixty days, but the hearing was held beyond that time. Denying
the motion, the bankruptcy court found the lateness of the hearing
to be fatal to the trustee's motion. "The language of the section is
very clear. An extension of the time period must be made within
the original 60 days. Merely filing a motion is not the equivalent of
actually being granted an extension. "173 The filing of the motion to
extend does not toll the statutory period of section 365(d)(4), said
the court, nor may a subsequent decision outside the sixty days be
related back. 174 Bankruptcy Judge Russell was unequivocal in his
choice of words: "Thus, the trustee or debtor-in-possession must
obtain a hearing and a decision within 60 days."' 75 Lastly, the
court emphasized this was "clearly what Congress intended. The
17 6
language of the statute is unequivocal."'
The foregoing two cases contributed to the cumulative decision
of In re Coastal Industries, Inc.177 Also concerning a motion to
extend the time to assume or reject as in Southwest I, the facts in
Coastal were somewhat unique. The original hearing date for the
motion was calendared for the sixty-first day after the entry of the
order for relief. Perceiving the dilemma of the hearing being held
one day too late, the unsecured creditors' committee appeared and
obtained ex parte an order granting a one-day extension of the
statutory sixty-day period. At the scheduled hearing, held on the
sixty-first day, the debtor and the creditors' committee sought a
78
further extension, with the landlord objecting.
Denying the request for a further extension, Bankruptcy Judge
171. Id.
172. 53 Bankr. 805 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985) [hereinafter Southwest I], aff'd, Southwest
Aircraft Servs., Inc. v. City of Long Beach (In re Southwest Aircraft Servs., Inc.), 66 Bankr.
121, 123 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Southwest II].
173. 53 Bankr. at 808-09.
174. Id. at 809 (emphasis added). Accord In re Capellan, 39 Bankr. 40, 41 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla., 1984) (the obvious statutory purpose is to preclude the court from retroactively extending the time for assumption subsequent to the expiration of the 60 day period).
175. 53 Bankr. at 809 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 810.
177. 58 Bankr. 48 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
178. Id. at 49.
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Devito found it would be violative of the statute to grant another
extension outside of the sixty days. Looking first to the crucial language of section 365(d)(4), the court found "[t]he mandate of
365(d)(4) is unequivocal in that it demands either assumption, rejection, or a fixing of additional time within that sixty-day time
frame . . . the Court is bound to deal with 365(d)(4) as it now
'17 9
reads.

Mindful of the general principle of statutory construction that a
plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted, 80
Bankruptcy Judge DeVito opined: "The Court would truly be gazing with a jaundiced eye were it to perceive some ambiguity within
365(d)(4). Its language in fixing the time within which the debtor
must act is unequivocal . .

.

. [A]ny attempt to invoke change by

judicial legislation here and now would be highly improper."181
As further guidance in addressing a matter of first impression in
that jurisdiction, the court closely examined Southwest I and, by
implication, By-Rite I. "As in Southwest [I]," the Coastal court
"agree[d] to conform to what was clearly legislated by the Congress. '1 82 Therefore, Bankruptcy Judge DeVito found "section

365(d)(4) demands that this Court hear, decide and grant any extension within the original sixty days following the entry of the
order for relief."' 83
The rationale of the Coastal doctrine was applied by Bankruptcy Judge Holland in In re House of Deals of Broward, Inc.""
In deeming the lease at issue rejected because the hearing for an
extension was held beyond the sixty-day period, although the motion was filed prior to the expiration of that time, the court noted
the decisions on this issue which had reached opposite conclusions. "Nevertheless, the court looked to, among other things,
Southwest I and arrived at "the logical conclusion that a court can
only grant an extension of time beyond the original 60 days if a
179. Id.
180. Id. at 50 (citing 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 194 (1974)).
181. Id. at 50.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 51 (emphasis in the original). Accord In re Taynton Freight Sys., Inc., 55
Bankr. 668, 671 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (Gibbons, J.). The language of § 365(d)(4) "emphasizes the clear Congressional intent that Sec. 365(d)(4) be strictly construed . . . [i]f the
Court is to grant an extension of time beyond the 60 days, this must occur before the 60 day
period expires." Id.
184. 67 Bankr. 23 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
185. Id. at 24.
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hearing is held and the motion granted within these 60 days."186
Looking also to the legislative history, Bankruptcy Judge Holland
ruled:
The term "assumption" contemplates not only the debtor in possession
making a motion to assume, but also the court granting such motion. Both
events must occur within the initial 60-day period unless an extension is
granted within these same 60 days.
This court is cognizant of the potential hardships that could arise from a
strict enforcement of this statute. However, "when the express language of a
statute is clear, a court will not adopt a different construction absent clear
18' 7
legislative history contradicting the meaning of the words.

The significance of Coastal was magnified by the sharply worded
dissent authored by Circuit Judge Anderson in Southwest III. Declaring the relevant statute to be without ambiguity, Judge Anderson contended "[t]he majority ignores the plain meaning and the
structure of the pertinent portions of section 365(d)(4).' ' s Indeed,
he found the assertions of the majority opinion were "couched in
189
speculation and are without logical or authoritative support.
First, the dissenting opinion describes sixty days, as called for in
section 365(d)(4), as not really such a short period as the majority
contended. "Significant and important decisions are often made in
those time frames. . . . [J]udges . . . are quick to respond to.
emergency situations."' 1 90
Second, the majority paid "lip service" to the legislative history
but failed to acknowledge that Congress was attempting to correct
the "chaotic" situation for lessors of nonresidential properties. 191
Looking to the plain intendment of section 365(d)(4), Judge Anderson opined:
The purpose of the section was clearly intended to provide protection to
lessors by requiring the trustee or debtor in possession to make prompt decisions (if not already made) to either assume, reject, or to file to extend the
period in which the debtor or trustee must do one or the other. The majority decision is . . . unsupportable. 92
186. Id. (emphasis in the original).
187. Id. at 25 (quoting Gusam Restaurant Corp. v. Speciner (In re Gusam Restaurant
Corp.), 737 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1984) (Pierce, J.)). See also In re Alba Press, Inc., 55
Bankr. 127, 130 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Holland, J.) ("There is no obscurity or ambiguity"
in § 365(d)(4)).
188. 831 F.2d at 854.
189. Id. at 854-55 n.2.
190. Id. at 855.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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As in Coastal, the dissent considered it would be gazing with a
"jaundiced eye" if it ruled otherwise and found any ambiguity in
section 365(d)(4).19

Deeming the statute "clearly and positively" demands court action within the sixty days, 194 the dissent refused to second-guess
the wisdom of Congress in enacting section 365(d)(4) and its time
limits and criticized the majority opinion as leading to "unprincipled decision making.

1' 95

In brief, the ratio decendi of Coastal and the other cases contributing to its doctrine illustrate an adherence to the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. Immune from criticism as judicial
legislation, these cases comprise the better view because they support a clear application of section 365(d)(4) and allow for decisions
made on the basis of sound principles of statutory construction.
ANALYSIS

Examining all of the foregoing that has brought us to the present
day state of section 365(d)(4), a number of factors make themselves clear and lend support to the Coastal doctrine that court
approval for the assumption or rejection of unexpired, nonresidential, real property leases is necessary and must be given within the
statutory sixty days.
First, the legislative history is itself remarkable because of the
Senate's persistence in obtaining the passage of the so-called shopping center amendments. As the House's contribution was nil, one
can look to the Senate's actions as a clear reflection of the legislative intent.
Here we have the responsible Senate committees recognizing the
deficiencies in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and moving forward to rectify the situation. Unperturbed by the demise of the
1982 version of S.2297, the Senate brought its proposals forward
again and again in the 1983 Shopping Center Tenant Bankruptcy
Protections Improvements Act and as part of the Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements bill of that same year. Finally, enactment
was achieved in 1984 with BAFJA. This single-minded determination of the Senate by itself speaks to that body's desire to incorporate specific protections for shopping center lessors and solvent tenants into the Bankruptcy Code. As observed by Chief Bankruptcy
193.
194.
195.

Id. (quoting In re Coastal Indus., Inc., 58 Bankr. 48, 50 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986)).
Id.
Id. at 856.
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Judge Paskay, section 365 was enacted "for the sole benefit for
owners of nonresidential properties primarily for the benefit of
owners of shopping centers."19 6 Earlier the same eminent jurist had
pointed out that "Congress clearly intended to accelerate the [assumption/rejection] process in order to protect a certain class of
1 97
creditors.
To be sure, a number of courts aligned with the Southwest III
school have emphasized the legislative statements that these enactments were intended to compel the trustee or debtor in possession
to make its decision to assume or reject within the sixty days. The
foregoing language has been interpreted by some to mean that
since the approval of the court was not explicitly mentioned also, it
was not intended to include court approval within the sixty days as
well. Such an interpretation misapprehends the intention of the
legislators and views such statements to such a degree of isolation
that it renders them meaningless.
One must be mindful of the context of the Senate's deliberations. As noted at the hearings, concern was expressed not only for
the delays attendant to the making of a decision by the trustee,
but also to the further extension of that uncertain time frame by
the process of judicial review and approval. In particular, the testimony of Mr. Feinstein as to the lengthy time involved in motion
practice and court deliberations cannot be glossed over as not being a point of concern for both the witnesses and the Senate. It
would be sheer folly to suggest that the Senate, so concerned with
the burdensome delays in such cases, would merely wish to view
one aspect of the problem in isolation. It would make no sense for
that body to so strenuously address itself to sanctioning time limitations for the decision to assume or reject while ignoring a concomitant need for judicial action within the proscribed time. To do
so would leave the matter still very much open to the very delays
the Senate so vigorously fought to bring to an end. The position
that motions for assumption or rejection should be decided within
the sixty days or any extension thereof "is consistent with the legislative intent to resolve the uncertainties relating to the status of
the lease relationship. "198
196. In re J. Woodson Hays, Inc., 69 Bankr. 303, 309 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
197. In re Condominium Admin. Servs., Inc., 55 Bankr. 792, 798-99 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985).
198. In re House of Emeralds, Inc., 57 Bankr. 31, 35 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) (Chinen,
J.), rev'd, In re Diamond Head Emporium, Inc., 69 Bankr. 487, 493 (Bankr, D. Haw. 1987)
(Chinen, J.).
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Indeed, one need only look to section 365 in toto to realize the
greater scheme the legislature had in mind. One cannot ignore the
fact that the statute begins by conditioning assumption or rejection on the court's approval. Given the principles of statutory construction as aforementioned, section 365(d)(4) is clearly dependent
upon the stricture of section 365(a) that court approval is
mandatory. Given such, the clear conclusion to be drawn is that
the sixty day limitation imposed on the assumption or rejection of
nonresidential, real property leases must include in that process
the aspect of court approval. As so many of the aforecited cases
have decreed, an act of assumption or rejection without court approval is meaningless.
The unqualified nature of section 365(d)(4) in establishing the
sixty day limit speaks against any attempt to truncate the process
necessary to complete the assumption or rejection of an unexpired
lease. Furthermore, the language of section 365(d)(4) imposing the
sixty day limit for approval should be read to apply to all the acts
contemplated therein, be it assumption, rejection or an extension
of time to assume or reject. It defies logic and results in unwarranted judicial hair-splitting for a court to deem the sixty day limit
to apply to some of the acts but not all.19 '
It is this Congressional edict that must be followed. Rulings such
as those found in Southwest III are outspoken in declaring that
Congress could not have intended to dictate court calendars.
Firstly, it is overstating the matter to assert Congress overextended itself by imposing a time restraint for action under section
365(d)(4). Limitations of time are not new to the bankruptcy
court.20 0 Nor, as stated in Circuit Judge Anderson's dissent to
Southwest III, does the sixty day limit here represent an egregiously short time period. More importantly, one must bear in
mind Justice White's opinion in Palmore v. United States,'"
where the high Court stated that "the judicial power of the United
States . . . is (except in enumerated instances applicable exclusively to this [Supreme] [C]ourt) dependent for its distribution
199. See In re National Paragon Corp., 74 Bankr. 180, 181 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)
(Ditter, J.) (finding court approval must be given within the 60 days to grant an extension,
but may be given outside the 60 day limit to assume or reject).
200. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (the automatic stay terminates 30 days after the
request of a party unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders the stay continued. If
the hearing noted above is a preliminary hearing, the final hearing must be commenced no
later than 30 days following the conclusion of the preliminary hearing).
201. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon
the action of Congress."20 The bankruptcy courts, as Article I
tribunals, are more subject to Congress' dictates in their execution
of the laws of bankruptcy enacted by that same Congress pursuant
to its constitutional entitlement.2 3
It is this legislative intent, both explicit and implicit, that is
honored by the Coastal doctrine in its respect for the totality of
the concerns addressed by the Congress and that section 365(d)(4)
was enacted to rectify. Moreover, Coastal adheres to the plain language of the statute in its imposition of the sixty day limit for
court approval and thus avoids the pitfalls of judicial legislation.
Yet one need not rely on the legislative history or the words of
the statute itself for support of the proposition that court approval
is a necessary part of the assumption or rejection process to be
accomplished within the sixty days. Dating back to the former
Bankruptcy Act, we see how the Fifth Circuit in Texas Importing
rejected the troublesome standard of informality and espoused the
better view that formal court approval is a necessary part of assuming or rejecting a lease, a position followed by the Seventh Circuit as well. As could be expected, the evolution of this better view
carried over into the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.
Culminating in the Kelly Lyn decision, the courts under the
Code continued to demand court approval be a requirement for the
completion of the assumption or rejection of an unexpired lease.
Thus, until the 1984 enactment of section 365(d)(4), the prevailing
decisions mandated court approval come before a lease was
deemed finally assumed or rejected. In consideration thereof, this
doctrine obtains under the Code and should continue to control.
To be sure, no logical reason has been proffered to deviate from
this postulation because BAFJA raised an additional requirement
of action within the sixty days. It would be making an artificial
distinction to now hold that, merely because of the addition of a
time constraint, the final step of court approval must now be segregated from the rest of the process. Certainly the bankruptcy courts
comprising the Coastal school did not subscribe to this deviation.
The virtue of the doctrine postulated by Coastal and its progeny is
that they adhere to the stated requirement of court approval, irrespective of any new time limit.
By contrast, the Southwest III case presents major difficulties in
202.

Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

203. U.S.
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any attempt to reconcile its findings. The Southwest III school indulges in judicial legislation by attempting to reform section
365(d)(4) to state that the assumption or rejection process does not
include court approval within the sixty days. This not only ignores
the plain meaning of the statute based upon its own language, but
extrapolates that provision to say something that it does not.
"While the resulting effects on debtors can be devastating, Congress enacted the 1984 Amendments [including section 365(d)(4)]
knowing the harsh effects and presumably intended them. It is not
for courts to second guess Congress in making an obviously political decision."2 04 Yet this is just what Southwest III proposes to do.
Consider also how Southwest III does violence to the plain language of section 365(d)(4). As so ably pointed out by Circuit Judge
Anderson's dissent thereto, the Ninth Circuit perceived ambiguity
where none exists. Coastal, by comparison, avoids this shortcoming
and furthers principled decisionmaking as called for by the Southwest III minority opinion. The reasoning of Coastal is superior in
that in follows the established principles of statutory construction
as heretofore discussed. This is particularly crucial here because as
stated by now-Chief Bankruptcy Judge Lifland in BSL Operating
Corp. v. 125 East Taverns, Inc. (In re BSL Operating Corp.), °5
"[w]hile compliance with the mandate of section 365(d)(4) requires
requirement to meet. The statute is
alacrity, it is not a difficult
20 6
demanding, but clear.
It must be remembered that the most important point with respect to the case law espousing the Southwest III position is that
it flys in the face of the judicially mandated requisite that court
approval is absolutely necessary to assume or reject a lease. Without it, the process is not truly complete. This latter view, as noted
previously, has been adopted by a number of circuit courts. Indeed, as stated by Bankruptcy Judge Thompson in In re Las Margaritas, it is the rule in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as was
recently confirmed by now-Justice Anthony Kennedy in Harris
Management.
Given the uncontroverted position of that appellate tribunal,
Southwest III stands as an unwarranted diversion from its own
circuit's plain and simple rule by bifurcating the process and
parsing out court approval as an additional step to be done outside
204.
205.
206.

In re Re-Trac Corp., 59 Bankr. 251, 256 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (Kressel, J.).
57 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Id. at 951 (debtor failed to take any action whatsoever within the 60 days).
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the sixty days. HarrisManagement deems that assumption or rejection is incomplete without court approval. No substantial reason
has been offered to justify that, simply because the Congress imposed a time limit on the assumption or rejection process for nonresidential real property leases, it has now become necessary to
treat court approval as a separate, distinct step in that particular
process. Southwest III errs in that while it acknowledges its role it
puts court approval aside for another day.
Coastal represents a view that is consistent with the declaration
by the ninth circuit in Harris Management, as well as statements
by other circuit courts, that court approval is necessary to complete the process in all cases. As such, it is a step which should be
done within the sixty days and not arbitrarily extracted from the
other steps to be one within the proscribed time. In this way,
Coastal comports with the edicts of the various circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit in particular, and fulfills the requirements of section 365(d)(4) respecting constraints as to time and
required action. Unlike Southwest III, Coastal does not ignore either the legislative intent, the unambiguous meaning of section
365(d)(4), or the well-established precedents.
Not to be overlooked is the further danger offered by the Tigr
Restaurantdecision. As aforestated, the district court judge looked
to the availability of the broad powers granted under section 105
as a possible means to override section 365(d)(4), should all else
fail in efforts to reach what that court considered a more equitable
decision. A similar tack was taken by Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky in In re Curio Shoppes, Inc.2"' Finding the principal issue
before it to be whether equitable considerations could be employed
in applying section 365(d)(4),208 the court concluded that equitable
principles could be utilized to negate the effect of section 365(d)(4)
by selectively applying that statute where a court finds a literal
enforcement thereof would be highly inequitable.0 9
To be sure, bankruptcy courts are courts of equity.2 10 Nonetheless, this does not justify judicial selectivity in applying an unambiguous statute. Such reasoning led to the holding of Curio
Shoppes being rejected by Wilson v. Sonora Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (In re Sonora Convalescent Hospital, Inc.).21 1 There
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

55 Bankr. 148 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 155.
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966).
69 Bankr. 134 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1986).
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Bankruptcy Judge Hedrick rebutted the debtor's argument that
the court follow the Curio Shoppes test of equitable considerations
and then utilize section 105 to prevent an automatic rejection of a
nonresidential lease under section 365(d)(4). "Careful reading of
this section [105] indicates that the court is only empowered to
issue orders, etc. that are necessary to carry out the provisions of
this title. The court is not empowered to so broadly interpret a
'
code section as to . . .render section 365(d)(4) null and void."212
This is consistent with the statement of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals that "these equitable powers [of section 105(a)]
are not a license for a court to disregard the clear language and
meaning of the bankruptcy statutes and rules."'2 1 As written by
Bankruptcy Judge Leal, "long-standing policy supports application
of the restrictive approach to the bankruptcy court's exercise of its
power under Section 105. ''214 In this regard, it is clearly the better
view that the broad powers of section 105 not be misused for the
purpose of rendering section 365(d)(4) a nullity under the guise of
equitable considerations.
In addition, sound principles of statutory construction deem that
section 105(a), as a grant of general power to the bankruptcy court,
not circumvent the specific purposes of section 365(d)(4). "Where
a particular and a general enactment may both be applicable, it is
settled statutory construction that the particular . . . will control. 21 5 To be sure, the discrete purpose of section 365(d)(4) cannot be overcome by the general powers of section 105(a).
By reason of all of the above, it is clearly incorrect for the courts
to employ equitable powers under section 105 to defeat the objectives of section 365(d)(4). This possible avenue to circumvent the
latter provision should be deemed foreclosed, thus rebuffing the
Tigr Restaurant branch of the Southwest III school.
212. Id. at 138 (emphasis in the original). Accord In re Criadores De Yabucoa, 75
Bankr. 96, 97 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987) (Lamoutte, C.J.) (the court cannot "override the mandate of and explicit provisions of § 365(d)(4) through the equitable injunctive powers of §
105(a)).
213.
1987).

Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir.

214. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. TEx. L. REV. 487,
490 (1988).
215. Essenfeld v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 208, 210 (2d Cir. 1962), quoted in Gusam
Restaurant Corp. v. Speciner (In re Gusam Restaurant Corp.), 737 F.2d 274, 277 n.3 (2d Cir.
1984) (Pierce, J).
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REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

Given the obvious need to correct this evisceration of section
365(d)(4), due consideration should be given to new legislation
designed to correct the present situation. Before embarking upon
that task, it would be appropriate to briefly review the legislative
proposals which predated the present Code and BAFJA.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
proposed in "The Bankruptcy Act of 1973" that in liquidation
cases the trustee be given an original sixty day period to assume an
unexpired lease and a single opportunity to extend such time for
another sixty days, resulting in "a total 120-day limit on the trus'
For reorganization cases, the
tee's power to assume or reject."216
trustee could assume at any time prior to the confirmation of a
plan or in the plan itself, but a party could request the court to
order the trustee to assume or reject within a specified time not
exceeding thirty days.2 1
Recently, the National Bankruptcy Conference considered this
matter via its Committee on Stays, Executory Contracts, and
Property of the Estate. 218 The Committee noted that the Confer-

ence had not previously taken a position on whether the court
must act within the sixty days.2 19 Suggestions were made first that
the court should be subject to a time constraint, and second, that
it might be appropriate to require the court to act within the earliest practicable time.2 20 A counter-proposal was made that would

have imposed an absolute limit of 120 days on the filing of a motion to assume or the entry of an order to extend the time to file
such a motion. 221 This suggestion was not voted upon. Instead, the

Committee voted 24 to 6 in favor of a proposed amendment to section 365(d)(4) to authorize the court to make successive extensions
of the sixty days on a motion made within the original sixty days
or made within any extended period, but with additional precatory
216. In re Telemark Management Co., 51 Bankr. 623, 625 n.1 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984)
(Frawley, J.) (citing H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Part II § 4-602 at 152-53
(1973)).
217. Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro, 681 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1982)(per curiam)
(citing H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Part II § 4-602 at 152-53 (1973)).
218. Summary of Proceeding of the Annual Meeting of the National Bankruptcy
Conference October 29-31, 1987, 84 Bankr. No. 2 at 19, 29 (West Bankruptcy Reporter Advance Sheets May 24, 1988).
219. Id. at 31.
220. Id. (statements by Conferees Marsh and Treister, respectively).
221. Id. at 32 (Statement of Conferee King).
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language that the court should act as soon as practicable.222
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Conference's Drafting Committee submitted a draft of a revised section 365 subsequent to the
Report of the Committee on Stays, Executory Contracts and Property of the Estate.22 83 The draft recites a new section 365(d)(1) that

holds an unexpired nonresidential real property lease must be assumed within 120 days or within such additional time as the court,
for cause, fixes by order entered within that original 120 days or
any extension thereof 22 4 Section 365(d)(4) would be modified to
simply demand immediate surrender of the property to the lessor
if the trustee does not assume.226
Although meritorious, the foregoing proposals are not entirely
true to the original legislative intent behind section 365(d)(4) and
the historical precedents that shaped the process of assuming or
rejecting unexpired leases under the Bankruptcy Code. Nor does it
seem that these same proposals fully address the multitude of
problems which have arisen since the 1984 enactment under
BAFJA.
With this in mind, it is herein proposed that, upon a revisitation
of this matter by the Congress, the following points be considered.
First and foremost, any amended section 365(d)(4) should explicitly state that the act of assumption or rejection of an unexpired
lease of nonresidential real property most assuredly contemplates
court approval as the final, requisite step in that process, and, as
the last step that completes the act, court approval absolutely
must be given within whatever period of time Congress deems appropriate to insure the protection of the lessor and the solvent tenants whom this legislation was initially designed to safeguard.
Second, while it is asserted here that the present sixty day period is not clearly inappropriate by any means, the proposal to expand the time to assume or reject to 120 days might be considered
as a compromise. This should ameliorate any perceptions of the
harshness to the trustee or the debtor in possession which served
to motivate so many courts to bifurcate the process and place court
approval outside the current sixty day period. To be sure, if an
amendment explicitly keeps all the necessary steps, including court
approval, within the proscribed time, it would seem that the expansion of that period to 120 days remains true to the overall goals
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 31-32 (proposal by Conferee Treister).
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
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of section 365(d)(4) without great sacrifice of the time so precious
to the lessors and solvent tenants.
Next, the possibility that further extensions could be granted after the original 120 days elapses should be strictly foreclosed. One
and only one extension should be permitted. To permit a window
of opportunity to exist that would allow bankruptcy courts to
grant successive extensions would most certainly disrupt the entire
intent and purpose of section 365(d)(4). Instead of clarifying the
insolvent lessee situation, such an option would merely perpetuate
the uncertainty so detrimental to the entities that the statute
should protect.
Apropos to this point, if the trustee is permitted to seek an extension within the original time, the extension itself should have
an upper limit comparable to the original period. In other words, if
an initial period of 120 days to assume or reject is adopted, the
trustee should be allowed, within that original time frame, to seek
one and only one extension. Such extension should furthermore be
limited to 120 additional days, thereby keeping the extension congruent to the initial statutory period. Again, while a possible 240
day span is at first blush lengthy, the absolute requirement that
court approval be obtained as the final step therein shall do much
to alleviate the concerns of lessors and solvent tenants.
Lastly, any proposed amendment should make clear that, absent
extraordinary circumstances, the broad, equitable powers of the
bankruptcy court, particularly those emanating from section 105 of
the Code, should not be utilized to overcome section 365(d)(4). To
leave this possibility open would mean 'that a clear, unambiguous
statute could be cast aside and the statutory purpose thereof defeated if the court found some equitable considerations it deemed
compelling enough to override section 365(d)(4). To be sure, equi.
table powers might need to be employed as a desperate measure,
but a requirement of a showing of a clear and convincing need, for
example, might be emplaced to curtail any possible misuse.
It is suggested here then that the Congress invite further commentary so it might fully consider the issue once again. Notwithstanding such debate, it is asserted here that the proposed course
of action recommended above represents amendments true to the
original and proper intentions which led to the enactment of section 365(d)(4) in the first instance.
CONCLUSION

In reviewing all of the foregoing material concerning the neces-
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sity of court approval for the assumption or rejection of unexpired
nonresidential real property leases, a number of conclusions may
be drawn. Initially, the legislative history preceding the enactment
of section 365(d)(4) clearly demonstrates Congress' intent to afford
special protections to lessors by establishing clear limitations on
the time for the act of assumption or rejection to be completed.
Second, while others might disagree, the statute is plain on its
face in requiring court approval to be part of the process of assumption or rejection, and thus, by necessity fall within the ambit
of section 365(d)(4)'s time frame. Equally, if not even more importantly, the case law unequivocally states that court approval is indeed the final, requisite step in the process that gives the assumption or rejection vitality.
This proposition has evolved from the better view rejecting the
ambiguities of the former Bankruptcy Act to the clear rule of law
under the more explicit strictures of the Bankruptcy Code. If court
approval is indeed the last step, it defies rationality to remove that
aspect and place it outside the time limit mandated by Congress.
Given all of the above, the holdings to the contrary must fall as
they rely upon concerns which are clearly overcome by the weight
of legislative and judicial precedents already set forth herein.
Third, the refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in
the Southwest III case indicates that guidance from the high
Court shall not be forthcoming, leaving the various courts split
amongst the divergent Southwest III and Coastal doctrines. Thus,
a judicial resolution is not in the offing. To the contrary, the future
holds only the prospect of further, protracted litigation.
Finally, this leaves it to the Congress to revisit the issue, devise
and then enact appropriate remedial legislation. Not only does this
seem to be the sole option remaining, it is clearly the best, since
Congress itself is the best judge as to what it truly wishes section
365(d)(4) to accomplish. On that point, the legislators should consider the current proposals for change and refine them so they
might properly and definitively reflect the Congressional intent.
In closing, this article contends the sum of all of the foregoing is
clearly indicative of the necessity for court approval of the assumption or the rejection of unexpired leases of nonresidential real
property to be given within the sixty day period, as presently mandated by section 365(d)(4). In view of the present dichotomy
among the courts, it is time for the Congress to enact remedial legislation to clarify the true policy behind section 365(d)(4) and restore its ability to implement those purposes. The time has come
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for the "jaundiced eye" to be healed so the clarity of the vision of
section 365(d)(4) can be restored.

